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Brexistential Angst and the 
Paradoxes of Populism: On  
the Contingency, Predictability 




The time-travelling political scientist stepping out of her time machine today, having started her 
journey even 5 years earlier, would be amazed and, no doubt, shocked by the world in which she 
found herself. What sense, if any, might she make of British politics after the vote for Brexit – and, 
indeed, of the politics which gave rise to it? And what does the answer to that question tell us 
about how the vote for Brexit happened, how it was allowed to happen, its wider implications 
(both political and economic) and the seismic changes in and through which British politics is 
currently being remade? In an inevitably prospective and necessarily provisional way, I seek to 
reflect on the paradoxes of populism and neoliberal globalism that Brexit reveals as a way of 
drawing out a few of its implications for the conduct of British political analysis in a world in which 
Brexit could happen yet was essentially unforeseen.
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The Paradoxical Contingency of Brexit
To those who either think that a predictive science of politics is possible or, without 
having thought about it very much, proceed on the basis that it is, contemporary British 
politics presents something of a challenge.1 For who did – and who, credibly, could 
have – predicted Brexit, certainly the Brexit that Brexit will turn out to be?
But, however chastening in this respect at least it may be, it is hardly unique. Much 
that was previously solid, or seen to be solid, in British politics has melted into air in 
recent years; much has changed and little of that change was foreseen. Consider the 
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time-travelling political analyst stepping out of her Tardis on 24 June 2016 having just 
delivered her account of the recent re-election of Margaret Thatcher at the 1984 
Political Studies Association Conference. Then, to remind you, Peter Davidson was 
Doctor Who; the guardians of the Special Relationship were Ronald Reagan and, of 
course, the newly re-elected Margaret Thatcher; the Cold War was at its height; the 
Berlin Wall had yet to fall; Gorbachev was on the verge of becoming General Secretary 
of the Soviet Communist Party and the terms glasnost and perestroika were, as yet, 
entirely unfamiliar even to Western diplomats. The European Union (EU) was still the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the debate on European Monetary Union 
would take a further 5 years to begin in earnest. The Social Democratic Party had just 
split from Labour, the Liberal Democrats and UK Independence Party (UKIP) had yet 
to be founded and it was Labour and not the Conservatives who were divided over 
Europe.
Still reeling from her chrononautia, there is much that she might find disconcerting: 
That an anti-establishment party of the right that did not exist in 1984 (UKIP) would win 
nearly 13% of the vote in the most recent General Election having won scarcely 3% in the 
previous one (and, indeed, only 1.8% in the next one)? That the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) would win 56 out of the 59 available seats in Scotland in the very same election? 
That Britain’s third party (the Liberal Democrats) would suffer the largest single drop in 
vote share (15%) ever recorded in a post-war British General Election having been in a 
Coalition administration with the Conservatives until the election? That a Conservative 
Prime Minister could have called a referendum on British membership of the EU and that 
Britain could vote for Brexit in such a referendum?
But there is an irony here. For one would not have had to travel forward in time 3 
decades to find any of this shocking. The brutal reality is that none of these outcomes 
would have seemed very likely and virtually none of them were predicted even 5 years 
before. It need hardly be pointed out that the vote for Brexit has not exactly brought an 
end to this period of unpredicted and seemingly exceptional outcomes. Who, after all, 
would have predicted that having expressly said she wouldn’t and after the passing of the 
2011 Fixed Term Parliaments Act expressly intended to prevent such game playing, 
Theresa May would both gamble and have the opportunity to gamble her slender parlia-
mentary majority at the polls in order to strengthen her Brexit-negotiating clout? And 
who would have predicted that with an opinion poll lead of over 20% at the start of the 
campaign and in an election in which Labour and the Conservatives achieved their high-
est combined vote share since 1970 (in an era generally considered to have seen the death 
of bipartisanship in Britain),2 she would lose her parliamentary majority and end up gov-
erning with, of all parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)? You couldn’t make it 
up, and more to the point, no one did.
So, has something profound changed in the nature of British politics and, perhaps, 
politics more broadly? Has our politics become more profoundly contingent and unpre-
dictable than it has ever been? That, I think, is a very good question to pose. But, for me 
at least, the answer is no. Exceptional outcomes are, in a way, unexceptional – they are 
the very stuff of politics. The capacity to produce exceptional outcomes in the sense of 
outcomes that we would have to be very lucky to predict and, hence, very foolish to think 
that we could predict, show that the process producing them is itself political. But if 
exceptional outcomes are the very stuff of politics, then we need to be careful – more 
precisely, rather more careful than we tend to be – about what we think we know (and, 
above all, about what we think we can know) about that politics.
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It is with these questions that this article is principally concerned. Its argument pro-
ceeds in three stages. In the first, I consider the potential contribution of political science 
to our understanding of seismic shifts unfolding in real time, differentiating between the 
predictability and (retrospective) intelligibility of Brexit in the light of the necessary con-
tingency of both Brexit and its consequences. In the second, I reflect on the making of the 
vote for Brexit itself, considering above all the role of turnout differentials (anticipated 
and unanticipated) and, indeed psephology itself, in the generation of the outcome. In so 
doing, I hope to tease out some implications about the public responsibility of political 
scientists for the expertise they project into the public debate. In the third and final sec-
tion, I turn more prospectively to the implications of Brexit, seeking to identify a series of 
tensions and paradoxes already present in the vote whose resolution will determine which 
of the many possible Brexits Brexit turns out to be.
Brexistential Dilemmas
The Predictability and Intelligibility of Brexit
The parable of the time-travelling political analyst suggests the need to draw a clear dis-
tinction between predictability (the capacity to anticipate), on the one hand, and retro-
spective intelligibility (the capacity to make sense of something after the fact with already 
existing analytic resources), on the other. Put bluntly, the capacity to anticipate a social 
fact is not a good (nor, indeed, a legitimate) test of social scientific theory; the capacity to 
render a social fact intelligible retrospectively is. From such a perspective, the failure to 
predict that Brexit would happen is not, in and of itself, a theoretical failing in that Brexit 
is not knowable in advance of the crystallisation of the specific causal sequence bringing 
it to fruition. But the incapacity to make sense of Brexit in causal terms after the fact of 
Brexit is a failing (the failure of a legitimate test or expectation).
In this respect, the failure of political scientists and political economists to anticipate 
Brexit and/or to accord to it a low probability as an outcome is different in kind to the 
failure of mainstream economics to anticipate the global financial crisis (though cf. Blyth 
and Matthijs, 2017; Hopkin and Blyth, 2018). For in the latter case, the charge (at least) 
is that mainstream economics does not have the conceptual and analytic resources and 
capacity (based, as it is, on essentially equilibrium assumptions) to render intelligible the 
crisis it failed to anticipate.
While our time-travelling political analyst may lack the analytic resources required to 
make sense of what, to her, look like twenty-first-century anomalies, the same is not 
really the case for her twenty-first century peers. For, arguably, each of the exceptional 
(and unforeseen) outcomes identified above can be rendered intelligible (and has now 
already been rendered intelligible) in terms of the (contingent) articulation, interaction 
and interplay of quite familiar processes (some, indeed, familiar even to a political scien-
tist who learned her trade in the 1960s and 1970s). Among such factors are the following: 
(1) the growing regional and geographical differentiation of political cultures in a more 
dis-United Kingdom; (2) the increasing presence of non-majoritarian electoral systems in 
the UK polity and the ability to carry success from one electoral system to another; (3) the 
declining electoral appeal of valence politics; (4) declining partisan alignment and iden-
tification; (5) increasing electoral volatility; the ‘taint of office’; (6) the declining elec-
toral appeal of valence politics; (7) growing divisions within the Conservative Party over 
Europe; (8) the increasing use of referendums to resolve positional issues; (9) growing 
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anxieties about immigration and competition for jobs associated (rightly or wrongly) with 
EU enlargement and the free mobility of labour; and (10) growing economic inequality in 
a context of austerity and persistently low growth. If Brexit can be seen as a (potentially) 
seismic shift, then these are the fault-lines making it possible.
The point is that one can go a long way to explaining each and every one of the seem-
ingly exceptional political outcomes identified above, Brexit included, in terms of the 
interplay of a series of broader political trends already widely identified in the existing 
literature. If this is right, and the ‘exceptional’ is in fact explicable at least retrospectively 
in more general terms, the impression of a new condition of radical contingency afflicting 
our polity and our politics may well be misleading and something of an illusion. It may 
well also prove rather transitory. At times, British politics has been quite predictable; at 
other times, less so. Today it would appear less so. Yet this is not because it is, in some 
fundamental way, more profoundly contingent than it has ever been. Rather, and more 
simply, it is that a variety of long-term processes and trends that political scientists would 
claim to understand quite well come together and interact to produce a conjuncture in 
which a great many major issues will be resolved together in an unusually short space of 
time. In this conjuncture, British politics will not just develop, but also potentially change 
decisively with enduring consequences.
Hobsbawm’s Choice: The Inevitable Contingency or the Contingent 
Inevitability of Brexit
A second window on all of this is opened by an intuitively appealing if paradoxical apho-
rism of the late, great and much lamented historian Eric Hobsbawm. It looks immediately 
like an antidote to the kind of argument that I have been making. The line appears only 
once in his published writings – a characteristically provocative essay on the use of coun-
terfactuals in the history of Britain’s post-war reconstruction (Hobsbawm, 1993: 29). But 
apparently he used it a great deal in the seminar room, which perhaps gives me the licence 
to misquote it just a little. It goes something like this: ‘things turned out the way they did, 
and because they turned out the way they did they couldn’t have turned out any other 
way’ (see also Hay, 2002: 269). Recast in the terms of the present discussion, we get ‘the 
referendum on Brexit, the vote for Brexit and the Brexit to which it gave rise each turned 
out the way they did, and because they turned out the way they did they couldn’t have 
turned out any other way’ (on the contingency and inevitability of Brexit see also 
Thompson, 2017; Wincott, 2017).
The quote itself, and the implicit challenge it poses, is unsettling (intentionally so). But 
it is an altogether easier trope to trip from the lips of a historian (with the benefit of hind-
sight) than it is for a political analyst (who typically lacks such hindsight). Either way, it 
challenges directly the preceding argument. For it suggests that uncertainty is simply a 
problem of lack of knowledge – and, consequently, that if we knew more we would be 
able to predict better. That sounds intuitively plausible. But the clear implication is that 
prediction is both a legitimate and an epistemological test of a theory. The outcome (the 
thing that turned out the way it did), in Hobsbawm’s parable, is certain; it is just our 
knowledge of it that is lacking (it is only uncertain to us). As such, there is no condition 
of uncertainty in Hobsbawm’s ontological universe. Uncertainty, for him, is a purely epis-
temological phenomenon – epistemologically contingent not ontologically necessary.3 
The problem, as one can almost hear him adding, is that we are simply never capable of 
acquiring the knowledge that would be required to know how things will turn out in 
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advance of them turning out the way they were always going to turn out. That, for him, I 
suppose is the paradox of (our) uncertainty, and it is certainly frustrating for the political 
analyst. It is reminiscent of the meteorologist who, when asked for a weather forecast for 
2020, responds that the causal sequence that will produce the weather in 2020 does not 
yet exist and that, as such, no prediction is currently possible. The weather will be there 
to be predicted; just not yet!
While there is no problem with the meteorologist’s (convenient) retort, social and 
political systems are different in kind from natural systems – and the problem of certainty 
and uncertainty presents itself differently. By contrast, Hobsbawm I think is wrong. His 
position, perhaps more significantly, is an indulgence that I think a political analyst can-
not afford; for it is a profound disavowal of the political. Politics is made; and at the 
moment of its making it is indeterminate. As another, no less renowned historian, Charles 
Tilly (1991: 86) puts it, ‘we now live in one of many possible worlds’. From this perspec-
tive, there are always multiple possible outcomes. That does not make all outcomes pos-
sible (alas) and it does not make the unlikely more likely (alas). But it means that our 
future is always uncertain – and uncertain ontologically (it could, and at the moment of 
its making, can be made differently) not (just) epistemologically (we do not know enough 
to know how it will turn out).
That is neither good nor bad, though it is the very condition I would contend of things 
being political. The implication is, again, that while we might hope to make sense of 
Brexit we shouldn’t expect to be able to predict it; and that, in turn, has (or should have) 
implications for what we might credibly say about the consequences of Brexit (a point to 
which we return presently).
But there is a second problem, at least in the context of the present discussion, of 
Hobsbawm’s aphorism. For the things we are interested in here (Brexit and its conse-
quences) are still in play. As such, they have yet to turn out the way they will. And since 
they haven’t yet turned out that way, we remain in the dark as to the only way they could 
turn out. This reminds us again of the difference between the historian (concerned largely 
with things already resolved) and political analysts (concerned, certainly to a far greater 
extent, with things still in play). Yet the more one thinks about it, the more problematic 
even this is. For it is in fact rare for political analysts to be as heavily invested in processes 
that are still unfolding as they are with Brexit. We tend in fact to have more in common 
with the historians, typically sharing with them the comparative luxury of waiting for 
things to have turned out the way they will before we seek to make sense of them. With 
Brexit, the stakes are simply too high for that (certainly for analysts of British and EU 
politics and political economy); that means that we need to think very seriously about 
what we can legitimately expect to know about something still very much in the process 
of being made, the confidence with which we profess that knowledge and the appropriate 
caveats surrounding it.
That takes us well beyond our typical comfort zone. Yet if the value of the epistemo-
logical distinction that I have sought to draw between predictability and the rendering 
intelligible of things after the fact is accepted, then it might provide some help and guid-
ance here. Above all it suggests that, if we cannot expect to be able to predict that which 
we accept to be political and (hence necessarily) contingent, the best we can do is to 
describe prospectively the field of outcomes that our current approach is capable of ren-
dering intelligible retrospectively. In addition, and by way of commentary, we might per-
haps also offer a tentative assessment of the distribution of relative probabilities across 
this spectrum of conceivable outcomes. But it is difficult to see how we can credibly do 
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more. In short, those who failed to predict Brexit (and even those lucky enough to do so) 
need to be careful before telling us what its consequences will turn out to be.
To consolidate the point, it is perhaps worth considering Hobsbawm’s implicit episte-
mological test when applied directly to Brexit. If our general and collective failure to 
predict Brexit was simply a reflection of our lack of knowledge, it is surely worth asking 
what would we have needed to know in order to predict that an EU referendum would 
take place in the way in which it did (and not in some other way) and that it would result 
in the vote for Brexit that it generated (and not some other vote for Brexit).
Arguably, for things to turn out the way they did, many if not all of the following had 
to happen:4
•• Cameron needed to think that he could not win the 2015 General Election, cer-
tainly outright, such that he had little or nothing to lose in putting the commitment 
to a referendum on EU membership in the Conservative Party manifesto;5
•• The Conservatives needed to win, and to win outright,6 and then to honour that 
manifesto pledge in office;
•• Cameron had to fail to secure significant concessions from EU negotiators prior to 
the referendum;
•• There needed to be two not just one leave campaign, extending the range of hypo-
thetical (and mutually incompatible) Brexits ostensibly on offer (racist Brexit, pro-
tectionist Brexit, ‘global British’ Brexit and so forth);
•• Boris Johnson needed to join the leave campaign (and, in order to do so, and how-
ever paradoxically, had to judge that it couldn’t win but would nonetheless com-
mand the majority support of the Conservative rank-and-file who might provide 
the decisive electoral momentum for any leadership challenge he was later to 
make);
•• The remain campaign needed to repeat the errors of the ‘expert paternalism’ that 
had proved so disastrous in the Scottish Independence Referendum (Jeffery, 2016);
•• The ‘left behind of globalisation’ (as they have come to be known) needed to (be 
persuaded to) put aside their pocketbooks and discount the potential economic 
consequences of the Brexit they were to vote in favour of for more clearly political 
reasons;
•• The pollsters needed to under-estimate the leave vote by disproportionately dis-
counting the vote of the disaffected;
•• Many ‘soft remainers’ needed to follow the pollsters’ lead and discount the likeli-
hood of a vote for Brexit and stay at home;
•• Young remainers, in particular, needed to turnout in lower numbers than their more 
Brexit-inclined parents and grandparents;
•• Corbyn needed to become leader of the Labour Party and, in order for that to hap-
pen, moderate and right-wing anti-Corbyn Labour MPs needed (paradoxically) to 
conspire to vote for him in the first round of the leadership contest so that he might 
make it onto the ballot;
•• Even before that, Ed Miliband needed to have reformed the electoral college of the 
Labour Party so that it could be captured by Corbyn’s rank-and-file support base.
Arguably, that just about gets us from the General Election Campaign of 2015 to the 
outcome of the Brexit vote itself; to get us from there to where we are today, we need to 
add a few more similarly contingent factors:
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•• Theresa May had to seek to extend her majority in 2016, ostensibly to improve her 
bargaining position and Brexit mandate vis-à-vis the EU negotiators;
•• And she had to fail to do so catastrophically that she would end up reliant on the 
grace and favour (or ‘confidence and supply’) of the DUP for a parliamentary 
majority in such a way as to make the Irish border (and, in due course, the ‘back-
stop’) a potential breaking point in the Brexit negotiations (Tonge, 2017);
•• The Brexiteers had to seek to give Parliament the final say on any Brexit deal, 
despite the absence of a clear Parliamentary majority for the Brexit they sought 
(and certainly for any one of the various options proposed for it);
•• May had to yield to these self-same Brexiteers in committing herself to a parlia-
mentary vote on the Brexit deal that she was seeking to negotiate despite the fact 
that it was difficult (either then or subsequently) to envisage any kind of Brexit 
deal capable of winning a parliamentary majority;
•• May had to survive, within the same 2-week period, a vote of no confidence within 
her own party, the biggest defeat of an incumbent administration in a parliamen-
tary vote in the democratic era and a vote of no confidence in her government, yet 
decide to continue in office as Prime Minister until Brexit had been implemented;
•• The majority of Labour, Liberal Democrat, SNP, Plaid and Green MPs needed to 
think that by voting against the deal it would be possible to secure either no Brexit 
or less Brexit while a majority of Conservative MPs thought that rejecting the deal 
would provide either a no-deal Brexit or the prospect of an as yet harder Brexit (in 
short, that a vote to reject the deal would have the mirror opposite effect);
•• John Bercow, the Speaker of the House of Commons, had to decide to ignore the 
advice of the Commons Clerk and all historical precedent in ruling that a (mere) 
backbencher could table an amendment to a Business of the House motion put 
forward by the government, with the effect that the House of Commons was 
offered a vote requiring the Government to present a revised Brexit plan within 3 
days of any defeat to the proposed Brexit deal.
Put together, this is already quite a list. Clearly some of these factors are the product 
of short-term, almost whimsical, decisions and may well turn out to be of little or no long-
term consequence (Bercow’s exercise of the constitutional discretion afforded the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, for instance). But the point is that we simply do not know 
what will turn out to be significant in advance.7 Brexit has been made through the dynamic 
interplay between the highly contingent and sometimes prosaic on the one hand and the 
rather more predictable and seemingly significant on the other. Knowledge of the latter 
can only get us so far. And in terms of the compound contingencies of the Brexit process 
to date, this is arguably just the tip of the proverbial iceberg – not least since it makes no 
reference at all to the negotiating stance of the EU27. But the point is surely made already. 
While some of these contingencies were clearly more predictable than others, it is diffi-
cult even to render intelligible, let alone to have predicted in advance, how things turned 
out the way they did. To do so would, in effect, be the equivalent of having placed the 
largest successful one-way accumulator bet in history.8
The preceding discussion is intended to be chastening. My aim has been to remind us 
of, and to focus in on, the reasons for, the inherent difficulty of seeking to make sense of 
unfolding processes of potentially seismic change in real time. As I have sought to sug-
gest, and strange though it may seem, this is not something that we do frequently and it 
is, arguably, something for which modern political science does not prepare us especially 
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well. But that is most definitely not an argument for foregoing such a task. It is an argu-
ment for thinking seriously about our responsibilities as ostensible experts (purveyors of 
an expertise to others) in a context in which the use and misuse of that expertise is both 
highly contested and, crucially, stands accused by those on one side of a highly charged 
and polarised political debate of a disingenuous and misleading neutrality that disguises 
an essentially normative commitment to the status quo.
This is, perhaps, the curse of living and writing in Br-exiting times! It is also a chal-
lenge. In what follows, I return first to the making of Brexit and then to the potentially 
paradoxical character of the Brexit that Britain9 is still in the process of making in the 
light of my own cautionary remarks. In so doing I seek to address the challenge directly, 
by exploring how such cautionary reflections might lead me (and conceivably others) to 
revise or temper what I (and they) might otherwise be inclined to inject into the public 
debate.
The Making of the Vote for Brexit
Britain’s vote for Brexit on 23 June 2016 represents an exceptional, unprecedented, sin-
gular and, it is certainly tempting to suggest, an irreversible choice. But the preceding 
analysis suggests the need for caution even here. Of these four descriptive adjectives, 
‘irreversible’ is certainly the most problematic. For, although unlikely, it is still just about 
possible to imagine the process initiated by the vote for Brexit ending in a second refer-
endum and, as such, that Brexit might never take place.10 It is also possible – indeed, 
perhaps more credible – to imagine some long-term process of buyer’s remorse (fuelled 
perhaps by the economic consequences of actually existing Brexit) leading to a revisiting 
of Britain’s relationship with the EU and a referendum on ‘Breturn’, ‘Brentry’ or, perhaps 
best of all, ‘Bre-entry’.
What is clearer is that the choice for Brexit arose from a referendum on an issue of 
consistently low electoral salience – even in the 2015 General Election (with the 
Conservative’s manifesto containing Cameron’s referendum pledge) it was ranked the 
11th most salient issue shaping personal voting intentions according to YouGov. Yet, 
whatever its salience to voters, it is likely to have amazingly high domestic and interna-
tional political and economic implications – not least since it interacts significantly with 
many issues of much higher salience (like immigration and economic performance). It 
produced a result that, in effect, the entire Westminster political establishment had cam-
paigned (more or less enthusiastically) against, aided – or, at least, that was presumably 
their intention – by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and a variety of world leaders, including 
President Obama himself. The unanticipated result shocked the political establishment 
including, of course, many prominent Brexiteers. The irony, of course, is that one sus-
pects that Boris Johnson supported Brexit because he thought it couldn’t win while 
Theresa May supported remain because she thought it couldn’t lose. Either way, the result 
cruelly exposed, and not for the first time, the methodological challenges of polling in an 
age of widespread and growing political disaffection (especially where disaffection is 
itself a variable correlating strongly with one’s stance on the issue at stake).
For political analysts, the vote for Brexit is a fascinating and important event – rich in 
its potential to furnish a series of more generalisable inferences (the question typically 
being, ‘of what is Brexit an instance?’), and, for political elites around the world, a 
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frightening episode no less rich in its potential lessons and warnings – and with a series 
of alarming parallels (the election of Donald Trump perhaps being the most obvious and 
the most widely debated).
Although the result is, of course, well known, and has now been exposed to most 
forensic and sustained analysis, it is nonetheless important to remind ourselves of a few 
features of it, on which I will rely, before we proceed further. As we know, 51.9% voted 
leave on a 72.2% turnout (interestingly, turnout in the 1975 EEC membership referendum 
was a mere 64%). As such, the vote for leave in 2016 represents the largest vote for any-
thing in UK electoral history (with 17.4 million votes for leave against 16.1 million votes 
for remain).11 Yet, crucially, only two of the four constituent nations of the UK voted for 
leave (with 53.4% and 52.5% of the vote being for leave in England and Wales, respec-
tively, while 62% and 55.8% voted for remain in Scotland and Northern Ireland, respec-
tively, on rather lower turnouts). There was majority support for remain in all local 
authority areas in Scotland, while 241 of the 293 English local authority areas outside of 
London voted for leave. Support for leave has now been shown to correlate strongly 
(whether using individual or district-level data) with low educational attainment, low 
income, age, recent increases in (but not aggregate levels of) in-migration, anti-migrant 
sentiment, political disaffection, prior UKIP and Conservative support, national (as 
opposed to European or British) identification and, perhaps more surprisingly, low (not 
high) self-reported Internet and smartphone usage (see Alabrese et al., 2018; Clarke et al., 
2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Hobolt, 2016). Finally, and in part through these vari-
ous analyses, the vote for leave has come to be widely characterised as a vote of those 
‘left behind’ by globalisation (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017; Hopkin, 2017; see also Ford 
and Goodwin, 2014). 
So Why Did Brexit Succeed?
Why did British citizens vote to leave the EU, albeit by a narrow margin, on 23June 
2016? Four factors, I will suggest, are crucial, though really only one of them has been 
extensively discussed in the wider literature on the subject to date, which has tended 
to focus on the psephological variables and the composition of the vote rather than the 
context in which the vote took place (though, see the various contributions to British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations volume 19 (3/4), 2017; Diamond et al., 
2018; Jennings and Lodge, 2018). They are (1) Cameron’s negotiating strategy – simi-
lar in certain respects to that of Harold Wilson in 1975, but playing out very differently 
in a very different political context; (2) differential turnout between potential leave 
and potential remain supporters (associated, in turn, with the differential mobilisation 
of those for whom the issue was a valence question as against those for whom it was a 
positional question, with turnout significantly higher in the latter category); (3) the 
combination of political disaffection and socio-economic dislocation – with strong 
support for Brexit among those feeling displaced by globalisation, by labour-market 
precarity and the perception that such precarity was a product of high levels of in-
migration (significantly from East European accession states after 2004) and (4) the 
failure of the political establishment to convince the electorate of the (singularly 
malign, in its terms) economic consequences of Brexit – and the wider failure of a 
valence politics of what might be termed ‘expert paternalism’. Each factor is worth 
exploring in a little more detail.
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Cameron’s Political Brinkmanship
The first is Cameron’s negotiating strategy with the EU and the parallels with that of 
Harold Wilson in 1975 (on which, see Butler and Kitzinger, 1976; Daddow, 2016; King, 
1977). It is difficult to think of a more disastrous piece of political brinkmanship by any 
British Prime Minister (certainly since the Suez Crisis of 1956) than Cameron’s decision 
to put to the British electorate the question of continued EU membership and the politics 
leading up to that decision (see also Tooze, 2018: 545–548).
To be fair to him, the commitment to such a referendum in the Conservative manifesto 
for the 2015 General Election was made at a time when it seemed exceptionally unlikely 
that it would need to be honoured (though, for a different view, see Thompson, 2017: 
444).12 While it was not unthinkable that the Conservatives might emerge as the largest 
single party after the election, few if any commentators and none of the Party’s advisors 
anticipated the Conservatives governing alone after 2015. Moreover, of potential coali-
tion partners it was only UKIP who would be likely to accept a referendum as part of any 
coalition governing agenda (and they were likely to make the chance to vote for Brexit, a 
condition of any coalition agreement anyway). As such, the referendum pledge might 
well have seemed at the time a costless gesture.
It is just about possible, then, to see the Brexit referendum to which Cameron felt he 
had committed himself in the manifesto, as an unintended (and even slightly embarrass-
ing) consequence of his own success at the polls – and, in particular, his success is oblit-
erating his former coalition partners, the Liberal Democrats, in an election he had never 
expected to win.
But the more important point is that a Brexit referendum would have been unthinka-
ble, even to Cameron, in the absence of the lingering internecine warfare in his own party 
over the question of Europe. In the 1970s, it was Labour that was divided over Europe 
(leading to the 1975 referendum); since the mid 1980s and especially since Thatcher’s 
Bruges Speech (1988) and Black Wednesday (1992), it was the Tories. The point is that 
the only conceivable question to which a Brexit referendum was the answer was one that 
started and finished with Conservative Party unity. The positing and eventual calling of a 
referendum on Britain’s EU membership was only ever a strategy for managing internal 
party discipline.
In a way, Cameron gambled what he regarded to be Britain’s economic future on an 
always rather tenuous strategy for re-uniting his party – and one that failed so spectacu-
larly that it ended up costing him his own job and which still threatens to split the party 
today. Yet in so doing, he was arguably not entirely unlike Harold Wilson in 1975 (see 
also Saunders, 2016). But what Wilson got right, Cameron got catastrophically wrong – 
in large part because of the rather different political context in which their respective 
forms of brinkmanship were played out.
Wilson, too, was something of a reluctant European. He had argued passionately 
against Britain’s membership of the EEC in 1972. Yet, by 1975, he was (in today’s par-
lance) a pragmatic ‘remainer’, unimpressed by the, for him, nauseatingly integrationist 
tenor of the European ‘project’, but convinced in a rather more prosaic and practical way 
of the economic advantages of continued membership. Thus, when it came to preparing 
the ground for his own ‘in/out’ referendum on continued EEC membership, he picked, as 
negotiating points, substantive issues on which he was likely to gain significant conces-
sions (unlike Cameron), he secured essentially all the concessions that he sought during 
the renegotiation (unlike Cameron), he refused to campaign actively for the remain that 
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he tacitly embraced while making it very clear that his position was one of simple prag-
matism (unlike Cameron) and he was positively surprised by the result, a significant 
majority in his favour in each region of the UK (most unlike Cameron).
It could be argued that Wilson was lucky – he, too, gambled what he also regarded to 
be Britain’s economic fate on political contingency. But he did so in a context in which 
pragmatic economic paternalism (the expert adjudication of what was presented as a nar-
rowly economic issue) was significantly more likely to pay off. What is striking today is 
quite how difficult it is for political elites to make the case to citizens for something being 
in their shared or collective interest (Hay, 2007). In British politics, at least, it seems that 
the electorate is no longer capable of believing that something is in their interests if it is 
not directly opposed to the interests of someone else. The campaigners for Brexit seemed 
to understand that intuitively, and certainly, far better than their Remain counterparts with 
Michael Gove in particular seeking at times almost to turn the vote for leave into a rejec-
tion of the political appeal to dispassionate expertise – to considerable effect.
Turnout and Turnout Differentials
The second factor to which I would draw attention is that of turnout differentials – 
which, strangely, are hardly debated at all in the existing literature on Brexit (though for 
a rare exception, see Clarke et al., 2017: 208–211). It is almost certainly not the case that 
a majority of voting age British citizens supported Brexit on 23 June 2016. For, as ever, 
there were significant differences between the preferences of eligible potential voters, on 
the one hand, and the preferences of those of the electorate who were both registered to 
vote and who chose to vote on the other. This is not, in anyway, to question the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the outcome – turnout was, of course, high and the furnishing of a 
democratic mandate has never relied upon 100% participation. So Brexit was the demo-
cratically legitimate outcome of the referendum. As such, it is difficult to argue that it 
should not now be honoured (whatever one might think of the potential economic 
consequences).
But it is nonetheless instructive to reflect on the fact that the vote for Brexit was the 
product of significant turnout differentials between potential ‘remainers’ and potential 
‘Brexiteers’. What is now clear is that, had there been a 100% turnout, Britain would have 
voted for remain and would probably have voted clearly for remain. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, had remain-minded and leave-minded voters turned out at a common and rather 
more credible 70%, the result would almost certainly have been different. The point is 
that predictable differences in turnout made Brexit always more likely than the polls sug-
gested (for precisely such a ‘prediction’, see Hay, 2016).
There are, in fact, a number of differential turnout effects at work in the Brexit result. 
Among these, three are familiar, well established and relatively widely discussed. They 
are: (1) age cohort effects – the propensity for the elderly to turnout at much higher rates 
than the young and disproportionately to vote for leave (Franklin, 2004; Hay, 2007: 49–
54); (2) national variations in turnout levels, with participation rates in remain-supporting 
Scotland (67%) and Northern Ireland (63%) being significantly lower than those in leave-
supporting England (73%) and Wales (72%) (and with turnout typically lowest in areas 
where there was either little or no campaign for ‘leave’, as in much of Scotland, or where 
electorates were accustomed to having little or no impact on the result of UK-wide elec-
tions); and (3) a London (and more general metropolitan) effect – with turnout both low 
in London and lowest in those areas of London in which support for remain was strongest 
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(typically areas characterised by high levels of both migration and poverty). The only 
significant factor pushing in the other direction was education – which was strongly cor-
related with both turnout and with support for remain (see, for instance, Alabrese et al., 
2018: Table A.2).
These factors are all well known and well documented. But arguably there is a fifth, 
that although largely absent from the debate is arguably at least as important. It is the dif-
ference in engagement, mobilisation and, ultimately, turnout between those for whom the 
question of Brexit was a valence issue (a question of determining the shared collective 
good of the community) and those for whom it was a positional question (a simple ques-
tion of political preference). From the perspective of the remain campaign, the question 
of continued membership of the EU was a valence issue. Brexit was simply bad for all. 
The question was, in effect, a technical and largely economic matter to be determined 
through the use of appropriate expertise. In stark contrast, for both the official and unof-
ficial leave campaigns, Brexit was a positional issue – a question of politics not of eco-
nomics, a question of values, personal conviction and identity which simply couldn’t be 
reduced to a set of technical considerations that might be adjudicated through the use of 
such expertise (or even sub-contracted to the experts).
In drawing attention to this distinction, my aim is not to pass a judgement on the 
political merits or otherwise of the remain campaign’s valence construal of the question 
of Britain’s EU membership. It is not difficult to understand why a more emotional and 
more political appeal was rejected in favour of a form of ‘expert paternalism’ as I shall 
call it. Instead, my aim is to point to one of the potential consequences of that choice – 
namely, a lower capacity to mobilise voters, especially in a campaign in which one’s 
opponents were engaged in a very different style of (positional) politics. The valence 
politics of remain was always likely to leave more of its natural support at home than the 
positional politics of Brexit, particularly with many voters discounting the possibility 
that leave could win. In terms of turnout, positional politics trumps valence politics 
every time.
Bringing these factors together may well make Brexit seem almost inevitable, at least 
with the benefit of hindsight (and not just in the Hobsbawmian sense that since things 
turned out the way they did they couldn’t possibly have turned out any other way). But 
that is the wrong inference to draw here. The success of the Brexit campaign in ‘getting 
out its vote’ should not be underestimated – and there are lessons to learn from this. While 
we should not exaggerate the extent to which the vote for Brexit was a product of political 
disaffection and economic alienation (the majority of those who voted for Brexit were, 
after all, typical and habitual Conservative voters), we should not underestimate the 
capacity of the Brexit campaign (official, unofficial and in combination) to mobilise those 
typically characterised in the literature on political disengagement and disaffection as 
apathetic non-voters. The Brexit vote gave many of them a voice. Arguably, this is its 
most remarkable feature.
This leads to a final observation about turnout and expertise, albeit expertise of a rather 
different kind – the expertise of the pollster. It is credible, I think, to suggest that the poll-
sters played quite a significant, if inadvertent, role in the making of the vote for Brexit. 
Throughout the campaign, it is now clear, they systematically underestimated the likely 
size of the leave vote. In large part, they did so because they underestimated the capacity 
of the leave campaign to mobilise the serially disaffected and those serially accustomed 
not to vote. There is nothing terribly surprising about that failure, especially given the 
methodological difficulties inherent in seeking to construct a vote projection from polling 
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data for a one-off referendum of this kind (in which all sorts of potentially problematic 
turnout estimations need to be made).
But three points of some significance nonetheless follow from this. First, getting it 
wrong in this way may well have contributed to keeping portions of the remain vote at 
home in that it encouraged them to think that they did not need to vote in order for Britain 
to remain an EU member state. Second, and conversely, it may well have contributed to 
boosting the vote for leave, by making it easier to think of this as a relatively costless and 
largely symbolic protest against the political establishment (both domestic and European).
The third implication is of a rather different kind. When the pollsters came to re-assess 
their methodologies in the light of their (perceived) failure to have anticipated the vote for 
Brexit (and, indeed, Cameron’s majority in 2015 and May’s vanishing majority in 2017), 
their conclusion was that they had actually done rather well (see, for instance, Sturgis 
et al., 2016). Electoral outcomes aren’t easy to predict, especially in times characterised 
by high electoral volatility, referendums pose even greater challenges and, crucially, their 
predictions for the 2015 and 2017 General Elections and the EU referendum, though 
wrong in the rather obvious sense that they failed to anticipate the result, all fell within 
the declared margin of error. The implication of the preceding discussion is that such a 
conclusion is simply not good enough.
The question is not whether the pollsters did the best job they could have done meth-
odologically. It is credible to think that they did. Their failure was not methodological but 
presentational. If polling is inherently tricky, polling in referendums doubly so, then the 
caveats need to come first and in a rather larger font size. The responsibilities of the politi-
cal analyst (pollsters included) demand a sharing of the methodological limits of the 
analysis with those for whom it is intended from the outset. They also demand a much 
greater sense of responsibility for how the expertise provided is and might be used and 
misused. It is simply not sufficient to say that the science was good and that the result fell 
within the margin of error if most of those who consulted the poll were not even aware 
that there was a margin of error.
That brings us to the third and fourth set of factors, which it makes sense to discuss 
together. 
Brexit and the Politics of Expertise
Brexit represents the failure of a certain style of politics and the triumph of another. That 
triumph might well prove temporary, but it is certainly credible to think that it might 
endure. Above all, Brexit represents a rejection of the politics of expertise, at least in its 
current form, and of expert paternalism in particular. Arguably, the zenith of this expert 
paternalism was the ‘this is good for you because we tell you that it is’ of the remain 
campaign in both the Scottish Independence and EU referendums.
In stylised terms, the rise and demise of expert paternalism might be seen to have 
passed through three stages.
In the 1960s and 1970s, political elites were themselves trusted to deploy appropriate 
expertise, and the growth in the expertise available to them led to a confidence in their 
ability to govern (paternalistically) in the collective good.
By the 1980s and 1990s, particularly in the Anglo-liberal democracies, political elites 
were typically no longer trusted to deploy expertise themselves. Such expertise needed to 
be depoliticised and placed at one remove from them (Burnham, 2001). Only experts, in 
this conception, could genuinely discern the collective good – and could only do so if 
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their expertise were protected and insulated from political influence. The result was a 
politics of ‘expertocracy’ and depoliticisation, in which positional issues were recast as 
valence issues and placed in the hands of (nominally) independent experts – central bank-
ers and the like.
Brexit rejects that. Its mantra – ‘taking back control’ – is not just about taking back 
control from Brussels, but taking back control of politics from experts too (and perhaps 
also taking back control of politics from those political elites who would seek to cede it 
to experts). In a sense, there is little point and hence little to be gained by taking back 
control from Brussels if that control is simply to be passed domestically from the elected 
representatives of the people to their favoured purveyors of expertise. The implied re-
politicisation of the domestic polity could take, and might still take, a variety of forms. 
But, for now, it is predictably the right, and the populist right at that, that has shown itself 
most at home with, and most deft in deploying, this new vernacular. It is populist; it is 
nationalist; it is dis-integrationist; it is anti-internationalist; it is, as Albert Weale (2016) 
puts it, nostalgically democratic – and it has the capacity to recast British domestic poli-
tics and, in the process, its political economic interdependence.
It also has potentially profound implications for political scientists as, at least poten-
tial, purveyors of expertise, in a context in which such expertise (in the form of ‘impact’ 
or ‘publicly relevant research’) is an ever more highly incentivised marker of professional 
standing and achievement. Here is not perhaps the place to pursue these issues in the 
detail that their significance warrants. Suffice it to note that if there is to be an, arguably, 
long overdue, recalibration of the relationship between the suppliers of expertise and the 
exercise of democratic governance, then we will need to think long and hard about the 
responsibilities that come with the provision of such expertise. Four points immediately 
present themselves. First, even the genuine, neutral and dispassionate provision of a non-
normative scientific knowledge (such as the pollster’s psephology) can have a significant 
partisan effect, as in the potential contribution to the making of the vote for Brexit played 
by polling data in the preceding discussion. Second, and rather more generally, the use by 
political elites of expertise as a mechanism of governance has served to mask, obfuscate, 
depoliticise and, arguably, de-democratise decision-making processes, not least by turn-
ing positional issues and questions (‘who benefits and who suffers from an interest rate 
rise?’) into valence issues and questions (‘what is the optimal interest rate setting for an 
economy such as ours at a moment like this?’). Third, any attempt to define more clearly 
the responsibilities of the expert needs surely to insist on a much more sharply drawn 
distinction between the expertise itself and the use made of that expertise by decision-
makers if the democratic accountability of the decision-making process is to be main-
tained. And, fourth, a much greater emphasis needs to be placed on communicating the 
limits to the expertise provided (the margin of error and the methodological reasons for it 
are just as important as the most probable predicted outcome).
Brexit and the Paradoxes of Neoliberal Globalism
In the concluding section of this article, I turn to some more prospective considerations, 
in identifying some of the potential contradictions, tensions and paradoxes of Brexit, 
particularly in terms of its political economic implications. These paradoxes arise in part 
from the fact that Brexit still remains to be made (and, as a consequence, might still turn 
out very differently) and in part from the fact that the aspirations for Brexit of those who 
voted for it (and, indeed, those who campaigned for it) are so diverse and contradictory. 
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The vote for Brexit was not, and never could be, a vote for a particular Brexit; it was a 
vote for as many different Brexits as it was possible to imagine wishing to vote for. How 
those multiple imagined Brexits become one substantive Brexit is a process which can 
scarcely fail to disappoint many, if not most, of those who voted for it.
The first paradox is that Brexit (and, above all, the anti-migration sentiment with 
which it has retrospectively come to be associated) has become, in effect, the political 
imperative to trump all economic imperatives. Yet, at the same time, it will almost cer-
tainly turn out to be a medium- to long-term mechanism for ratcheting up such economic 
imperatives and the disciplinary logic they tend to impose (see also Baker and Lavery, 
2018; Gamble, 2018, 2019; Lavery, 2019; Rosamond, 2018). After almost 3 decades in 
which the British polity has danced to the tune of competitiveness, labour market flexibil-
ity, price stability and austerity in such a way as to place them and any policy associated 
with their attainment, above political debate and contestation, Brexit looks like a stagger-
ing reversal. For, albeit only in honouring a referendum verdict that it campaigned against, 
the British government has chosen to prioritise above all else the implementation of the 
staunchly anti-immigrationist sentiment that it interprets the vote for Brexit to be, regard-
less of any economic harm it might cause.
What is perhaps most striking about Brexit, then, is that we see a British government, 
arguably for the first time in recent political history, taking what it clearly regard to be a 
phenomenally significant political and economic choice without regard for its own eco-
nomic assessment – indeed, in open violation of the advice of its own Treasury and, more 
recently, the Bank of England. So much, one might think, for governance by perceived 
economic imperatives; so much for normalised neoliberalism. So much for ‘there is no 
alternative’ (TINA); it turns out that there was an alternative after all.
On the one hand, then, Brexit might be seen as the end of 3 decades of depoliticisation –  
a political and politicised ‘taking back control’ of things (arguably like migration policy) 
previously subject to a dull logic of economic expediency. Yet, on the other hand, and 
perhaps more credibly, it might be seen as a highly politicised, but temporary moment in 
the transition to the next phase of depoliticisation. In this conception, the process of eco-
nomic adjustment to the yet harsher competitive conditions of the post-Brexit scenario 
can only serve to ratchet up several notches a logic of compulsion in which economic 
imperatives trump, as never before, political choices. In a sense, it is both; and, as such, it 
reminds us of the potential fragility of the institutionalised depoliticisation of economic 
governance that we often associate with neoliberalism, particularly in the face of a newly 
resurgent populism.
In a similarly paradoxical vein, Brexit might also be seen either to herald the return of 
protectionism (and certainly to arise from the expression of a protectionist reflex) after 4 
decades in which the mantras of liberalisation have predominated (Hopkin, 2017). Or, 
conversely, it might be seen to signal the rise of a more purist neoliberalism – neoliberal 
globalism in one country, as it were. Here it might be remembered that, for Michael Gove, 
Boris Johnson and the official Brexit campaign, the problem with the EU (to which Brexit 
was the solution) was a problem conceived largely (if not explicitly) in neoliberal terms. 
For them, the EU represented not greater market integration and the elimination of barri-
ers to free trade and free capital mobility (the basis of Thatcher’s reckoning and rap-
prochement with the idea of Europe), but a mountain of ‘Brussels red tape’, unnecessary 
and over-burdensome regulation, the carrier and promoter of an illiberal ‘social model’ 
and the triumph of the ‘super-state’. It was a market distortion and an impediment, in 
other words, to neoliberalisation. The irony, of course, and the associated paradox is that 
16 Political Studies 00(0)
this is not really the Brexit of the May government – which has tended to resolve the 
ambiguity in the meaning of Brexit in favour of the unofficial Brexit campaign, thereby 
privileging a neo-conservative rather than a neoliberal objection to the EU. Like many of 
the targets of the new right in the 1980s, the EU appears in the cross-wires of both neo-
liberals and neo-conservatives and the campaign for Brexit was led by both. This has left 
a significant interpretive ambiguity around the meaning of Brexit – does honouring Brexit 
involve pandering to sovereigntist, neo-conservative, anti-immigration sentiment or to a 
neoliberal deregulatory disposition? The implications for Britain’s place in the world 
economy of resolving the ambiguity one way or the other could scarcely be more differ-
ent. But, as yet, we have no significant clarification of the extent to which populist 
impulses and neo-conservative reflexes will be allowed to trump neoliberal economic 
expediency.
A further paradox relates to the implications of Brexit for the character of Britain’s exter-
nal economic interdependence. On the face of it, and intuitively, Brexit might be imagined 
to unleash a series of de-Europeanisation tendencies. All things being equal, it should sup-
press the ratio of intra-regional to inter-regional cross-border economic transactions involv-
ing Britain, after 40 years in which the figure has grown steadily and consistently and 10 
years of modest decline. As such, Brexit might be expected to lead to a de-regionalisation 
and hence geographic globalisation of Britain’s external economic relations. But all things 
are not equal – and things are more complicated than this implies (see also Siles-Brugge, 
2018). For, in the short- to medium-term at least, Britain’s term of trade with the rest of the 
world are likely to suffer from Brexit just as much, if not more, as those with the EU27. For 
it was, of course, primarily through its EU membership that Britain came to enjoy its privi-
leged access to non-EU markets. Thus, whether Brexit leads to a net-globalisation or a net-
regionalisation of the British economy remains to be seen (and will be contingent upon 
negotiations that have really yet to begin in earnest). It is also likely to vary over time. 
Paradoxically and somewhat ironically, the short-term effect of Brexit may well be to 
deepen Britain’s regional economic interdependence, reversing the recent trend.
What is rather clearer is that Brexit is likely to lead, at least in the medium-term, to a 
yet more swinging and brutal form of austerity, even if its short-term effects are to post-
pone the point at which deficit reduction becomes debt reduction. For it can only suppress 
the growth potential (relative to pre-Brexit trends) of the British economy and that can 
only serve to escalate the costs of (pre-existing commitment to) austerity and to reinforce 
Britain’s reliance on private, asset-based welfare rather than public welfare (Farnsworth, 
2017; Hay, 2013). The macroeconomically destabilising and pro-cyclical character of that 
reliance suggest the long-term dangers of such a dependence.
This brings us to two final and rather different paradoxes. The first is that the revenge 
of the sovereign state – the victory of the nation-state over the member state as Chris 
Bickerton (2013) might put it – threatens the fragmentation and dis-memberment of the 
British state itself. For it is not clear that the increasingly fractious alliance of Great 
Britain, yet alone the increasingly anachronistically entitled United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland can endure the combined political and economic trauma of 
Brexit (McHarg and Mitchell, 2017; Wincott, 2018).13 Time will tell.
Finally, and perhaps most paradoxically of all, Britain’s rejection of neoliberal globali-
sation (insofar as that is deemed an appropriate characterisation of at least some of the 
support for Brexit) is, of course, likely to result in a reinforcement of the neoliberal char-
acter of Britain’s growth model at precisely the moment it becomes more exposed than at 
any point in the last 50 years to the rigours of a more genuinely global competition for 
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market share. It seems, in other words, that in and through Brexit, the ‘left behind’ of 
neoliberal globalisation have come to reject neoliberal globalism in favour of a yet more 
intense version of the same (Baker and Lavery, 2018; Perraton and Spreafico, 2019). That 
is some paradox and it is difficult to see it ending well.
Conclusion
That this is so is, of course, a consequence of the fact that Brexit is, like Thatcherism 
before it, a product of the complex interplay of liberalising and counter-liberalising ten-
dencies and counter-tendencies and a combination of neoliberal and neo-conservative 
reflexes. Put like that, it is hardly surprising that its effects are likely to prove both neo-
liberalising and counter-neoliberalising.
Each of these paradoxes and the contradictions and tensions, tendencies and counter-
tendencies from which they arise are already present and visible in the vote for Brexit and 
the ensuing politics of translation now in play. That translation process needs to find a way 
of turning a panoply of multiple imagined Brexits into one substantive Brexit – and it 
needs to do so through a process that is both bilateral and multilateral. In and through this 
negotiated process and its interaction with the domestically engendered paradoxes identi-
fied above, Brexit will become the thing that (in Hobsbawm’s terms) it was always going 
to become. At that point, things will have turned out the way they did (for good or ill) and 
we will see that they could not have turned out any other way. Without the foresight of a 
predictive science of politics and in the absence of a time-travel machine, the anticipation 
is already unbearable.
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Notes
 1. Earlier versions of at least parts of the argument developed here have been presented, at earlier stages 
in the making of Brexit, in public lectures at l’Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III (November 
2016), Sciences Po, Paris (December 2016), the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Society in Cologne 
(January 2017), the University of Sheffield (March 2017) and, more recently, King’s College, London. I 
am grateful to participants on each occasion for their probing comments and thoughtful suggestions, as I 
am to both the referees and editors of Political Studies. The usual caveats apply with even more than the 
usual vigour.
 2. See, for instance, Webb (2016).
 3. This is, of course, to assume that the aphorism accurately encapsulates that ontological universe and was 
not just conjured for the benefit of the cut and thrust of the seminar room.
 4. Precisely which and what combination, of course, depends on one’s preferred account of the vote for 
Brexit after the fact.
 5. Or, alternatively, as in the account of Adam Tooze (2018: 545–548; see also Thompson, 2017), that at 
the time of the Bloomberg speech in 2013, Cameron had to think that the threat of a referendum on EU 
membership would prompt the EU into a significant reform of its founding treaties sufficient to resolve 
the question of Britain’s long-term future in Europe (thereby obviating the need for the referendum ever 
to be held). The issue is, of course, a complex and intriguing one which cannot be adjudicated here. What 
is clear is that, as Tooze and Thompson both make clear, the dispositional divide between London, on the 
one hand, and Brussels and Frankfurt, on the other, on the regulation of financial service provision in the 
wake of the global financial crisis was an important factor (see also Hay and Bailey, 2019).
 6. Or, indeed, to govern in coalition with UKIP – but that would not have been for things to turn out the way 
they did. Things turned out the way they did and this is not how they turned out, so they couldn’t have 
turned out this way in the logic of Hobsbawm’s aphorism.
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 7. With the benefit of the additional hindsight afforded by the passage of time since this was written, you 
(the reader) are better placed than I to sift the list for the ephemeral and irrelevant, on the one hand, and 
the no-less ephemeral yet enduringly significant, on the other. That the ephemeral might turn out to prove 
significant is the ontological precondition of our epistemological uncertainty; and that is the point. It is 
by no means specific to Brexit, just as it is by no specific to Bercow’s machinations as the Speaker of the 
House in the making of Brexit.
 8. If only to find the currency in which the bet was placed crash on international exchanges the second the 
final horse crossed the finish line!
 9. In and through a simultaneously unilateral (if internally fragmented) and yet bilateral (and ostensibly 
diplomatic) process.
10. This is certainly not to imply that a second referendum would in any sense lead naturally to a reversal of 
Brexit – but simply to suggest that it could.
11. Interestingly, the vote for remain in 1975 was the second largest vote for anything in UK electoral history, 
narrowly squeezing into third place the vote for remain in 2016.
12. Thompson’s argument is that Cameron contemplated, in effect, the threat to the EU of a referendum on 
Britain’s continued membership, as part of a strategy designed to increase the pressure for the reform of the 
EU’s founding treaties and for a more favourable regulatory environment for the City of London. This is 
certainly true – as the Bloomberg speech of January 2013, in which the threat was first articulated publicly, 
makes clear. But, by 2015, this strategy had failed utterly and completely (see also Tooze, 2018: 546).
13. There is, of course, a certain irony here. For Brexit comes after 2 decades of major constitutional-territorial 
change. This has arguably contributed significantly to the dis-unification and, in a sense, the re-nationali-
sation of the constituent political cultures of the once United Kingdom. It is powerfully present in the very 
different levels of support for, and resulting politics of, Brexit in England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. And it now poses a Brexistential challenge. For Brexit itself can hardly fail to further widen these 
already deep political-cultural fissures (see particularly Hendersen et al., 2016, 2017; Wincott, 2018).
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